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constitutional discussions only when convinced that radio and television coverage will not disrupt court proceedings in any manner.
Nothing can be gained by simply shouting "fair trial" and "free
press" across discussion tables. The bar is interested in preserving
freedom of the press, but not at the expense of risking its tested procedures. On the other hand, the press is not attempting to undermine the historic guarantee of a fair trial.
The ultimate aims of bar and press actually do not differ. Each
side is striving to perform its function- public service-and protect our civil liberties. The controversy rages over the methods which
should be employed to attain that end, without detriment to the
segment of the population that becomes involved in litigation. Since
the legal profession controls court procedure, the press has the burden
of illustrating its ability to televise, photograph, and broadcast trials
without requiring a concession from the bar in dignity and decorum.
The solution reached in Colorado appears most desirable at the
present time. As noted above, Canon 35 was amended to allow the
trial judge, in his discretion, to permit radio and television broadcasting from the courtroom, provided the parties to the litigation raise
no objection. This amendment is unquestionably fair to all concerned.
It would give the press extended opportunities for trial coverage and
the bar and bench an avenue of escape in individual cases.
In any event, the legal and journalistic professions must continue
to work together toward an acceptable solution. If they should
choose to meet in all-out battle, much of the public esteem for each
profession, as well as the existing mutual respect, would be lost. No
one would win - neither the bar, the press, the public nor the litigant.
WM. TERRELL HODGES
C. LAWRENCE STAGG

MARITIME COLLISION DAMAGES
Admiralty courts in the United States have applied the division
of damages rule when a maritime collision has been caused by the
fault of both parties. This results in each vessel bearing an equal
loss. This rule was adopted from a similar English rule, which had
evolved over a long period of years.' Today, however, all important
'See Hay v. Le Neve, 2 Shaw 395 (H.L. 1824). The rule operated for 87 years,
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maritime nations, except the United States, have adopted the Maritime Convention as drawn up by the Brussels Conference of 1910,
under which the fault of the parties is measured proportionately and
the damages are divided accordingly. 2 The division of damages rule
may be considered as an intermediate position between the Maritime
Convention, which employs a rule of comparative negligence, s and
the common law rule of contributory negligence, which generally
is not applied in admiralty.4
The courts of the United States have developed a special set of exceptions to prevent the harsh results of a strict application of the
division of damages rule.. This note is concerned primarily with this
rule and its special exceptions.
BoTH VESSELS AT FAULT

As stated above, the application of the division of damages rule
results in each vessel bearing an equal loss. When only two vessels
are involved, this result is accomplished by adding the damages of
the respective vessels and dividing this total in half. The difference
between the resulting quotient and the amount of damages sustained
by the less injured vessel is recoverable by the one more extensively
injured. 5
For example:
Vessel A damaged to the extent of
Vessel B damaged to the extent of

$100,000
50,000

Total damages sustained

$150,000

giving way to the proportional rule of the Brussels Convention.
2Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules in the Matter of Collision,

Art. IV, Third International Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law at Brussels
(1909-10).
3See Mole and Wilson, A Study of ComparativeNegligence, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 333,
341 (1932).
4The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1, 15 (1890). But see Beldon v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674
(1893), which stated that it is well settled in admiralty courts that when both
parties are at fault, the damages will be equally divided. When, however, the suit
is brought in a state court or the law side of a federal court, the common law rule
of contributory negligence has prevailed; if both parties are culpable, neither can
recover.
5E.g., The Eugene F. Moran, 212 U.S. 466 (1909); The North Star, 106 U.S. 17

(1882); A. H. Bull S.S. Co. v. Exanthia, 234 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1956).
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One half of $150,000 is $75,000, which is the amount of loss each vessel is to bear.
Amount for each to bear
Damage to vessel B
Difference

$ 75,000
50,000
$ 25,000

This difference is to be paid by B to A in order to impose an equal
burden on each.
To have a division under the United States rule of divided damages, it must be shown that both vessels were at fault and that both
were injured as a result of the collision. 6 When the collision resulted
from the intentional wrong of both vessels, however, the rule does
not apply and the libel will be dismissed.7 If both vessels were at
fault, but the fault of one did not contribute to the collision, the
damages will not be divided.8 The vessel causing the collision will
sustain her own damages as well as those suffered by the other.
When the damages are equally divided, the division is between the
vessels and not the owners of the vessels involved. Thus in The
Norwich Victoiyo two tugs moored three loaded dump scows; both
tugs and scows later broke adrift and collided with a steamer. One
person owned the tugs and the scows; another owned the steamer.
The fact that one party was the owner of five of the six vessels and
would bear five-sixths of the total damages was held irrelevant.
GROSs FAULT RULE

When the fault of one vessel is, of itself, sufficient to account for
the disaster, reasonable doubts as to the conduct of the other vessel
are decided in the latter's favor under the gross fault rule.1° This
has also been referred to as the major and minor fault, or City of

6The Sapphire, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 51 (1873).
7Sturgis v. Clough, 62 U.S. 451, 453 (1858) (dictum).
sWebb v. Davis, 236 F.2d 90 (4th Cir. 1956); City of New York v. American
Export Lines, Inc., 131 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1942).
977 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Penn. 1948), af'd, 175 F.2d 556 (3d Cir. 1949).
IOThe Ludvig Holberg, 157 U.S. 60 (1895); The City of New York, 147 U.S.
72 (1893); The Elizabeth Jones, 112 U.S. 514 (1884); Matton Oil Transfer Corp. v.
The Greene, 129 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1942).
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New York, rule; its operation is said to place a burden on the grossly
negligent vessel to show that the other vessel was also at fault.
Operation of the rule is illustrated by Harbor Oil Transport Co.
v. The Plattsburg Socony,", in which one tanker, the New England,
while on the wrong side of the channel, endeavored to effectuate a
starboard-to-starboard passing by directing her course across the bow
of the oncoming PlattsburgSocony. A port-to-port passing was called
for by law in the circumstances of the case. A collision resulted. The
owner of the New England alleged that the Plattsburg Socony was at
fault for proceeding at a rapid rate of speed in congested waters
without a proper lookout. On appeal the New England was found
grossly at fault. The evidence introduced in the lower court was held
insufficient to establish the fault of the Plattsburg Socony. The appellate court stated that when one of two colliding vessels is grossly
at fault, and there is doubt as to the fault of the other, the doctrine
of gross fault exonerates the latter and makes the one grossly at fault
responsible for the entire loss.
ERROR IN ExTREMIs

When a vessel, by her own negligence or breach of a statutory
duty, places another in great peril, the latter will not be held guilty
of negligence because at the last instant she did something that contributed to the collision or omitted to do something that might have
avoided it.12 Even in extremis, all fault is not excused and some care
is still required. 13 Less judgment, however, is necessary in an emergency than when there is time to consider what action to pursue.
In one case a collision occurred between a Nicaraguan and a
Norwegian steamship.'14 The Nicaraguan ship, after signaling that
she was to pass port-to-port, attempted to cross the bow of the
Norwegian ship, thereby creating grave danger of a collision. The
Norwegian vessel blew three whistles and reversed her engine. It
was contended that if the Norwegian ship had held its course and
speed, the collision would have been avoided. The court held that
the Norwegian ship should not be held accountable for reversing
her engine, since this was done in extremis.
1151 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1945).
12The Havana, 54 Fed. 411 (D. Conn. 1893).
13A. H. Bull S.S. Co. v. United States, 34 F.2d 614 (2d Cir. 1929).
14The Clara Mattheu, 25 F.2d 123 (D. Mass. 1928).
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NEITHER VESSEL AT FAULT

In earlier cases, when neither vessel was at fault, the damages were
divided as if both were at fault. Today, however, there can be no
recovery, and each party must bear his own loss unless affirmative
fault is shown.15
One situation in which neither party is found at fault is the inevitable accident. This arises in two ways: (1) when a vis major, an
act of God, is the cause of the collision;" 6 (2) when both parties endeavor by all means in their power and by a proper exercise of nautical skill to prevent the accident. 17 The argument is that no one is
responsible for such an accident, since it is produced by causes over
which human skill and prudence can exercise no control.' 8 In The
Bonnie Billow, Inc. v. The Phantom,19 libelant's and respondent's
fishing vessels were tied to the same pier. During a hurricane the
bow lines of the respondent's vessel parted, and it collided with the
libelant's. The hurricane, a vis major, was held to be the cause of
the collision. Since human skill and precaution could not have prevented the result, the libel was dismissed.
Another situation in which admiralty allows no recovery is inscrutable fault. This arises when the evidence is so conflicting that
it is impossible to determine to what acts a collision is attributable;
thus there is a lack of proof that the vessel libeled is affirmatively
20
and specifically at fault.
MEASURE OF DAMAGES

Valuation of a vessel totally lost in a collision is based on the
principle of restitutio in integrum.21 The measure of damages is the
market value of the vessel immediately before the collision.22 How-

laThe Morning Light, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 550 (1864); The "Sunnyside," 91 U.S.
208, 215 (1875) (dictum).
16The Harold, 287 Fed. 757 (S.D.N.Y. 1922).
17The Teutonia, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 77, 84 (1875) (dictum).
1SThe "Sunnyside," 91 U.S. 208, 215 (1875) (dictum).
19150 F. Supp. 28 (D. Mass. 1957).
2OThe Jumna, 149 Fed. 171 (2d Cir. 1906); The Breeze, 4 Fed. Cas. 52, No. 1829
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1872).

21Standard Oil Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 268 U.S. 146 (1925); The Atlas, 93 U.S.
302 (1876); The Ozanic v. United States, 165 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1948).
22Standard Oil Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., supra note 21; The Ozanic v. United
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ever, if it is not possible to show the market value, other evaluations
are admissible, such as an opinion of a marine surveyor or engineer,
the cost of replacement less depreciation, or the amount of insurance
23
permitted to be carried on the vessel by marine underwriters. It is
not necessary for a vessel to sink to become a total loss. If the value
of a vessel before the collision is less than the reasonable cost of
repairs, there is a constructive total loss. The damages are the value
of the vessel at the time of the collision less any wreck value as salvage, without any allowance of demurrage, and with interest from the
2
date of the collision. 4
When partial damages are suffered, the restitution principle prevails as in the case of total loss.2 5 The general rule is to restore the
vessel to her condition at the time of collision. 26 The owner of a
vessel so damaged is not limited to compensation for the immediate
effect of the injury, but may recover for loss of freight, for expense
27
in making repairs to the vessel, and for detention of his vessel as well.
the value of the vessel as a reNo credit is given for any increase in
28
sult of the installation of new parts.
DETENTION AND DEMURRAGE

As a general rule, the loss of profits or use of the vessel during repairs or other detention arising from a collision is a proper element of
the owner's damages.2 9 These losses will be allowed if the owner was
justified in having repairs made at that particular time because of an
immediate and reasonable apprehension as to the seaworthiness of his
ship. 0 Otherwise, he will be required to make the repairs during
States, supra note 21.
23Carl Sawyer, Inc. v. Poor, 180 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1950).
240'Brine Bros., Inc. v. The Helen B. Moran, 160 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1949).
25The Cayuga, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 270 (1871); The Baltimore, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.)

377 (1869).
26The Zeller No. 12, 68 F. Supp. 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), aff'd, 166 F.2d 32 (2d
Cir. 1948).
27The Cayuga, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 270, 278 (1871) (dictum).
28E.g., The Baltimore, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 377 (1869); Shepard S.S. Co. v. United
States, III F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1940); Navigation Libera T.S.A. v. Newton Creek
Towing Co., 98 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1938).
29E.g., Miami v. Western Shipping and Trading Co., 232 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.
1956); The Conqueror, 166 U.S. 110, 125 (1897) (dictum).
3OPan-American Petroleum & Transp. Co. v. United States, 27 F.2d 684 (2d
Cir. 1928).
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his normal annual overhaul or at such other time as will not interfere
with the normal use of the ship. However, the detention damages
must be actual.31 If there would have been no demand for the employment of the ship had the accident not occurred, no compensation
for detention will be allowed.32
Damages for detention are "measured by the profits which the
owner would have realized from her use, had she been free."3 3 If a
substitute was actually chartered, a proper element of damage is the
difference between the cost of the substitute and the expense to the
3
owner had the collision not occurred. 4
DAMAGES TO CARGO

Before 1893 the loss that a mutual fault collision inflicted on a
damaged vessel included cargo damages, mitigated by the divided
damages rule.35 However, this rule did not deprive the cargo owner
of his right to recover the full amount of his damages from either
negligent vessel,36 and the impleading of both tort-feasor vessels as
defendants resulted in a decree declaring each liable for one half of
the damages.37 The failure of a shipowner to pay the moiety that he
owed entitled the cargo owner to recourse against the other shipowner
38
for payment of the balance.
The passage of the Harter Act 39 in 1893, substantially re-enacted
31The North Star, 151 Fed. 168 (2d Cir. 1907); The Nantasket, 290 Fed. 813
(D.C. Mass. 1923).
32Clyde S.S. Co. v. City of New York, 20 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1927).
3

a Agwilines, Inc. v. Eagle Oil & Shipping Co., 153 F.2d 869, 870 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 328 U.S. 835 (1946). See also The Mayflower, 16 Fed. Cas. 1243, No. 9345
(E.D. Mich. 1872), aff'd sub nom. The Dove, 91 U.S. 381 (1875).
34The Glendola, 47 F.2d 206 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nora. Standard Oil Co.
v. Glendola S.S. Corp., 283 U.S. 857 (1931).
35E.g., The Beaconsfield, 158 U.S. 303 (1895); The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302 (1876).
36The Atlas, supra note 35; The Alabama and The Gamecock, 92 U.S. 695

(1875).
37The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302 (1876).
3SThe Alabama and The Gamecock, 92 U.S. 695 (1875).
3927 STAT. 445 (1893), 46 U.S.C. §§190-196 (1952); see The Delaware, 161 U.S.
459 (1896); Green, The Harter Act, 16 HARV. L. REV. 157 (1903).
Prior to the Harter Act an absolute guaranty of seaworthiness was imposed
upon the shipowner, who was liable for latent defects in the vessel that resulted
in injury to cargo. See The Caledonia, 157 U.S. 124 (1895). After 1893 unseaworthiness due to any cause outlined in §3 of the Harter Act and not the result of
the shipowner's failure to exercise due diligence to make his vessel seaworthy im-
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in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 40 resulted in relaxation of the
carrier's general liability for cargo damage attributable to the negligent acts of its officers and crew in the navigation and management
of the vessel.41 The act exempted a seaworthy carrying vessel from
liability to the owner of its cargo. The cargo owner was thereby
limited to an action against the noncarrying vessel, whose liability
42
was consequently increased.
Subsequently the courts, in applying the divided damages rule, held
that any payments by the noncarrier to the owner of damaged cargo
on board the carrier are to be added to the total damages, which are
then divided. 43 Because the carrying vessel was thus indirectly liable
for one half of its cargo damage, 44 it was deprived of the express immunities of the Harter and the Carriage of Goods by Sea acts. As a
result carriers adopted a "both to blame" clause in their bills of
lading that obligated the cargo owners to reimburse them for claims
paid to the noncarrier under the divided damages rule. This clause
posed no liability on the shipowner. See The Carib Prince, 170 U.S. 655 (1898).
4049 STAT. 1207 (1936), 46 U.S.C. §§1300-1315 (1952); see Seaburgh v. Campania
Sud America de Vapores, 174 F.2d 423 (2d Cir. 1949); Pan-Am Trade & Credit
Corp. v. The Campfire, 156 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1946).
The provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act are substantially embodied
in the Ocean Bill of Lading known as the Hague Rules, adopted at the Brussels
Convention in 1924 and ratified by the United States in 1937 with the reservation
that in conflicts between the Hague Rules and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,
the provisions of the latter will control. The act is applied to voyages to and from
ports of the United States and foreign ports. 49 STAT. 1212 (1936), 46 U.S.C. §1312
(1952), A. M. Collins & Co. v. Panama R.R., 197 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1952). Today
the Harter Act extends to sea-borne traffic between domestic ports and to voyages
not within the scope of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. The Harter Act originally applied to voyages to and from the United States in foreign trade, 27 STAT.
445 (1893), 46 U.S.C. §90 (1952), but since the passage of the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act it has been held inapplicable to such voyages.
41The essential difference in operation of the acts is that under the Harter Act
the libelant cargo owner had the burden of showing the respondent carrier owner's
failure to exercise due diligence to make the ship seaworthy when the carrier owner
had successfully invoked the act's exemptions. However, under the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act the burden remained on the respondent vessel to show that the
alleged negligence did not contribute to the damages.
42But see Limitation of Liability Act, REv. STAT. §4283 (1875), 46 U.S.C. §183

(1952).
43The Chattahoochee, 173 U.S. 540 (1899); The Cockatoo, 61 F.2d 889 (2d
Cir. 1932); The Anna W., 181 Fed. 604 (E.D.N.Y. 1910).
44See United States v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 236 (1952); The Chattahoochee, supra note 43; The Cockatoo, supra note 43.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol11/iss1/4

8

Field and Muszynski: Maritime Collision Damages
UNIVERSITY

OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

was used for over twenty years until it was invalidated by the United
States Supreme Court, which declared it to be a prohibited limitation
on carriers' liability.45 The effect of this decision was to revive the
effect of the Harter and the Carriage of Goods by Sea acts as modified
by the divided damages rule.
INTEREST

In cases involving injury to a vessel by collision, interest on the
damages suffered is allowable in the court's discretion. 41 A common
situation in which no interest is allowed is when the libelant has de7
layed for a unusual length of time in commencing his suit.4

In libels against government vessels for damages resulting from a
collision, interest can not be recovered in the absence of either an
authorizing statute or a voluntary submission by the government to
48

the admiralty court's jurisdiction.
The rate of interest allowed is discretionary with the court. 49 Six

per cent is usually granted unless the collision occurs in inland waters within the jurisdiction of a state; then the statutory rate of the
state is normally employed.5°
As to the time at which the interest begins to run, the court in
The Hannah A. Lennen said:5 1
"The general rule is that, in collision cases resulting in the total
loss of a vessel, interest will be allowed from the date of the
collision. Where only damage occurs interest is often allowed
from the date of the expenditure for repairs. In either case
the rule governing interest is not rigidly applied where such
application is inequitable."
In summary, the divided damages rule has been generally applied
in American admiralty courts, but its application cannot be taken
for granted in all instances. Normally, damages have been allowed
45United States v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 236 (1952).
46Dyer v. National Steam Nay. Co., 118 U.S. 507 (1886).
47The James McWilliams, 240 Fed. 951 (2d Cir. 1917).
48Watts v. United States, 129 Fed. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1904).
49E.g., Hemmenway v. Fisher, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 255 (1857); The Manhattan, 10
F. Supp. 45 (E.D. Pa. 1935).
5OCambria S.S. Co. v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 212 Fed. 674 (6th Cir. 1914).
5177 F. Supp. 471, 472 (D. Del. 1948).
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